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COMMENTS
A LIE IS A LIE: AN ARGUMENT FOR
STRICT PROTECTION AGAINST A
PROSECUTOR’S KNOWING USE OF
PERJURED TESTIMONY
Charlie DeVore *
Nowhere in the Constitution or in the Declaration of Independence, nor for that matter
in the Federalist or in any other writing of the Founding Fathers, can one find a single
utterance that could justify a decision by any oath-beholden servant of the law to look
the other way when confronted by the real possibility of being complicit in the
1
wrongful use of false evidence to secure a conviction in court.

I. INTRODUCTION
A criminal prosecutor is simultaneously an adversary of the defense
and an agent of the sovereign. In dealing with testimony or evidence
favorable to a criminal defendant, these roles of the prosecutor have
conflicting incentives. As an adversary, the prosecutor is interested in
achieving a courtroom victory and convincing the fact-finder of the strength
of his argument. As an agent of the sovereign, however, a prosecutor’s
interest must be steadfast, both in convicting the guilty and in acquitting the
innocent. The Supreme Court has noted that “though the attorney for the
sovereign must prosecute the accused with earnestness and vigor, he must
always be faithful to his client’s overriding interest that justice shall be
done.” 2 The prosecutor is the servant of the law, which has the twofold aim
that “guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.”3
A zeal for victory has, from time to time, led prosecutors to knowingly
present false testimony in pursuit of criminal convictions. When a
*

J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2011; M.A. in Teaching,
Johns Hopkins University, 2005; B.A. in English, University of Missouri, 2002.
1
Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 988 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
2
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3
Id. at 111 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
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prosecutor uses perjured testimony to convict a criminal defendant, that
criminal defendant’s right to due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has been violated. 4 However, a
reviewing court must determine that the perjured testimony actually
affected the defendant’s trial in order to reverse the case.5 A circuit split
has developed around the issue of what test is appropriate to determine
when the impact of a prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony is
significant enough to warrant reversal of the conviction.
Both sides of the circuit split acknowledge that the perjured testimony
must be material to the trial. The Supreme Court established the standard
of materiality for a prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony in
Giglio v. United States: “A new trial is required if the false testimony
could . . . in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the
jury.” 6 However, circuit courts disagree on what should be done after false
testimony is found to be material under the Giglio standard. The Ninth
Circuit has held that the finding of materiality under Giglio necessarily
compels reversal. 7 The court foreclosed the idea of any further analysis
after a finding of materiality by asserting that once the Supreme Court has
declared a materiality standard for a particular type of constitutional error,
there is no need to conduct further analysis. 8 The First and Sixth Circuits,
however, have adopted a two-step analysis in determining whether a
prosecutor’s knowing presentation of false testimony compels reversal of a
conviction. First, the court must find that the perjured testimony meets the
Giglio materiality standard, and then the court must determine whether,
despite a finding of materiality, the use of perjured testimony can be
dismissed as harmless error. 9 The harmless error analysis is more
restrictive and makes reversal less likely than under the Ninth Circuit’s
singular materiality test. This Comment argues that a two-step analysis is
inappropriate because it has no foundation in Supreme Court jurisprudence,
violates the due process rights of criminal defendants, and removes an
incentive for prosecutors to be vigilant in ensuring that they do not present
false testimony.

4
See, e.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (stating that a “deliberate
deception of [the] court” by the presentation of perjured testimony is a deprivation of due
process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States).
5
See, e.g., Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31–32 (1957).
6
405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted).
7
Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
8
Id.
9
See Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577, 588 (6th Cir. 2009); Gilday v. Callahan, 59
F.3d 257, 267 (1st Cir. 1995).
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The Comment will begin in Part II with a discussion of the cases that
established and developed the materiality standard for a prosecutor’s
knowing use of false testimony. Early cases addressing this topic held that
a prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony was unconstitutional and
thus appropriate grounds for reversal. 10 Later cases established and refined
the materiality standard for knowing use of perjured testimony. 11 Part III
analyzes the cases comprising the circuit split, including the differing
factual scenarios and the adequacy of the justifications presented for the
reasoning in each case. In Part IV, this Comment argues that the two-step
analysis used by the First and Sixth Circuits is inappropriate. Subpart A
asserts that the two-step test is not supported by Supreme Court
jurisprudence and, further, that the test allows the more restrictive harmless
error standard to swallow the carefully calculated materiality standard.
Subpart B argues that the two-step test is not sufficiently protective of the
due process rights of criminal defendants and that it diminishes the
incentive for prosecutors to ensure that they do not present false testimony.
This Comment concludes that the Supreme Court should resolve the circuit
split and establish that where a prosecutor knowingly presented false
testimony at trial and the false testimony was material, there should be no
further harmless error analysis.
II. DEVELOPING THE RULE AGAINST A PROSECUTOR’S KNOWING USE OF
FALSE TESTIMONY
A. THE SEMINAL CASES

The Supreme Court first addressed a prosecutor’s knowing use of false
testimony in Mooney v. Holohan.12 There, the Supreme Court asserted that
a prosecutor violates due process if he presents false testimony or
deliberately suppresses evidence favorable to the accused. 13 The Court
stated:
10

See, e.g., Alcorta, 355 U.S. at 31 (see infra notes 16–23 and accompanying text); Pyle
v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942) (see infra note 15); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103,
103 n.2 (1935) (see infra notes 12–15 and accompanying text).
11
As mentioned above, in Giglio the Supreme Court established the materiality standard
that still applies today. “A new trial is required if the false testimony could . . . in any
reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury.” Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted).
12
294 U.S. 103 (1935). This case was before the Supreme Court on Mooney’s petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. The writ of habeas corpus allows a prisoner to obtain immediate
relief from unlawful confinement by challenging the constitutionality of his or her conviction
or sentence. Id.
13
In Mooney, the Court was prompted to address the due process concerns to answer the
California attorney general’s claim that a prosecutor could only violate due process if he
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[Due process] is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice
and hearing if a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which
in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate
deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured.
Such a contrivance by a State to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a
defendant is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the
14
obtaining of a like result by intimidation.

In these two sentences, the Court laid the foundation for the argument
that a prosecutor’s knowing use of false testimony is a violation of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is therefore
unconstitutional. 15
In Alcorta v. Texas, the Supreme Court advanced the jurisprudence
regarding a prosecutor’s knowing presentation of false testimony in two
important ways. 16 First, the Court found that the prosecutor’s failure to
correct false testimony was tantamount to the knowing presentation of false
testimony. 17 Second, the Court, for the first time, did what can accurately
be described as a materiality analysis.18 In Alcorta, the Supreme Court,
relying on Mooney and Pyle, held that a prosecutor’s knowing presentation
of false testimony violated due process.19 The prosecutor in this case
artfully asked questions of the key witness to avoid revealing facts that
would support the defense’s theory that the defendant committed murder
under the influence of sudden passion from adequate cause. 20 The Court
held that the prosecutor’s behavior at trial obscured the truth and was
therefore equivalent to presenting false testimony. This holding reinforced
the importance of protecting the criminal defendant from a prosecutor’s use
of false testimony. A violation was found not where a prosecutor presented
false testimony but where he had artfully asked questions to obscure the
truth. Further, the Court did a materiality analysis, though it did not ascribe

deprived a defendant of notice or prevented a defendant from presenting “such evidence as
he has,” and that an allegation of a prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony therefore
did not raise a federal question. Id. at 110–12.
14
Id.
15
The Supreme Court relied on Mooney seven years later in granting relief to the
petitioner where a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony. Pyle v. Kansas, 317
U.S. 213, 216 (1942) (“These allegations sufficiently charge a deprivation of rights
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, and, if proven, would entitle petitioner to release
from his present custody.”).
16
355 U.S. 28 (1957).
17
See id. at 31.
18
Id. at 31–32.
19
Id.
20
Under Texas law at the time, sudden passion was a partial defense, and a killing in
these circumstances would be considered murder without malice, punishable by a maximum
of five years imprisonment. Id. at 29.
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this label to the analysis. The Court held that the “petitioner was not
accorded due process of law,” 21 and then went on to explore the
prosecutor’s withholding of information known to him, and the likely
outcome if the truth had been revealed to the jury. 22 The Court concluded
that had the prosecutor not presented false testimony, the offense would
likely have been reduced to “murder without malice,” and thus would have
received a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment rather than the
death penalty. 23
The Court’s materiality analysis in Alcorta foreshadowed scenarios in
which a court could conceivably find that a due process violation was so
minor as not to require reversal. The Court’s analysis of the likely impact
of revealing the truth to the jury, followed by an order reversing the case,
indicates that the Court did not establish a rule of per se reversal, but rather
a rule inviting some analysis of impact of a prosecutor’s knowing
presentation of perjured testimony.
B. ESTABLISHING THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT TRIGGER
MATERIALITY

In Napue v. Illinois, the Supreme Court found that prosecutors are
prohibited from using false testimony both when the false testimony applies
to the defendant’s guilt and when it applies to a witness’s credibility. 24 In
Napue, the key witness for the State testified falsely that he had not
received any consideration or promise in return for his testimony. 25 The
prosecutor failed to correct this testimony. 26
The Supreme Court reiterated that where a conviction is obtained
through the State’s knowing presentation of false testimony, there has been
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; further, this result is the same
whether the State solicits the false testimony or allows false testimony to go
uncorrected when it occurs. 27 The Court stressed that the prohibition on a
prosecutor’s knowing use of false testimony “does not cease to apply
merely because the false testimony goes only to the credibility of the

21

Id. at 31.
Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31–32 (1957).
23
Id. at 32.
24
360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).
25
Id. at 265. At the time that the witness testified, he was serving a jail sentence of 199
years. The assistant state’s attorney prosecuting the case felt that in order to obtain a
conviction, he would need the testimony from the witness, who had aided in the crime that
led to a murder. He promised the witness that he would do everything possible to reduce the
witness’s current sentence in exchange for the witness’s testimony. Id. at 266–67.
26
Id. at 265.
27
Id. at 269.
22
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witness.” 28 Both evidence relating to a defendant’s guilt and evidence
relating to the credibility of a witness may be critical in a jury’s
determination of guilt or innocence: “it is upon such subtle factors as the
possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant’s life or
liberty may depend.” 29 To adequately determine whether a witness is
testifying truthfully, a jury must know whether the witness has received
some consideration for his testimony. In underscoring the importance of
evidence that relates to a witness’s credibility, the Court stated:
It is of no consequence that the falsehood bore upon the witness’ credibility rather
than directly upon defendant’s guilt. A lie is a lie, no matter what its subject, and, if it
is in any way relevant to the case, the district attorney has the responsibility and duty
to correct what he knows to be false and elicit the truth. . . . That the district
attorney’s silence was not the result of guile or a desire to prejudice matters little, for
its impact was the same, preventing, as it did, a trial that could in any real sense be
30
termed fair.

In addition, the Court considered whether evidence of the false
testimony was cumulative. 31 Lower courts asserted that the false testimony
regarding consideration in exchange for testimony had a diminished impact
because the jury had been presented with testimony that a lawyer from the
public defender’s office was “going to do what he could” for the witness. 32
Thus, lower courts reasoned, the jury had been presented with a potential
motivation for the witness to testify falsely against the petitioner. The
Supreme Court concluded, however, that the jury would likely attach more
weight to the truth, that the State had made a promise of consideration and
the witness was likely trying to “curry the favor” of the State by
testifying. 33
Though the Court in Napue mentioned the materiality standard of
whether “the false testimony could . . . in any reasonable likelihood have
affected the judgment of the jury,” 34 it failed to apply this standard or to
establish a materiality standard for future cases involving a prosecutor’s
knowing use of false testimony. The Court found that the prosecutor
violated Napue’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by
28

Id.
Id.
30
Id. at 269–70 (quoting People v. Savvides, 136 N.E.2d 853, 854–55 (N.Y. 1956)).
31
“[W]e do not believe that the fact that the jury was apprised of other grounds for
believing that the witness Hamer may have had an interest in testifying against petitioner
turned what was otherwise a tainted trial into a fair one.” Napue, 360 U.S. at 270.
32
Id. at 265.
33
Id. at 270.
34
The Court mentioned this materiality standard in reference to the State’s brief, which
argued that the Court was bound by the Illinois Supreme Court’s determination that the
constitutional violation did not rise to this standard. Id. at 271.
29
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holding that “the false testimony used by the State in securing the
conviction of petitioner may have had an effect on the outcome of the
trial.” 35 This standard established that a determination of materiality was
appropriate, i.e., that the prosecutor’s use of false testimony must be
significant enough to be deemed a violation of due process rights, but
provided little guidance for evaluating materiality in future cases. The
phrase “may have had an effect on the outcome of the trial” implies that
some analysis must be done but provides no prospective standard for
establishing whether a defendant’s rights have been violated.
In Brady v. Maryland, the Court expanded and clarified constitutional
prohibitions on a prosecutor’s withholding of evidence favorable to a
defendant and established that due process rights are violated where
withheld evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.36 This case
did not involve a prosecutor’s knowing presentation of false testimony but
rather a prosecutor who suppressed the confession of a defendant’s
confederate, Boblit. At trial, Brady had admitted to being involved in a
murder but argued that his confederate delivered the fatal blow.37 Thus, the
petitioner conceded to being guilty of first-degree murder and asked the
jury only to foreclose the possibility of capital punishment. 38 Despite the
petitioner’s trial counsel’s specific request to examine Boblit’s extrajudicial
statements, the prosecutor withheld the statement that would have been
most helpful to the defense. 39 Since the petitioner was charged with felony
murder and admitted to being involved in the perpetration of the crime that
ended in the killing, the suppressed confession was not relevant to guilt or
innocence, but just to punishment. 40 On these grounds, the court of appeals
held that there had been no constitutional violation, as the petitioner would
have been found guilty regardless of the confession. 41
Citing the cases detailed above, the Supreme Court ruled that the
“suppression of this confession was a violation of the Due Process Clause
35

Id. at 272 (emphasis added).
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
37
Id. at 84.
38
In Maryland at the time, the jury was responsible both for determining guilt and for
noting on the verdict form whether capital punishment was recommended for a murder
conviction. Id. at 89.
39
“Several of those statements were shown to him; but one dated July 9, 1958, in which
Boblit admitted the actual homicide, was withheld by the prosecution and did not come to
petitioner’s notice until after he had been tried, convicted, and sentenced.” Id. at 84.
40
Felony murder is “[m]urder that occurs during the commission of a dangerous felony.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (9th ed. 2009). Since Brady admitted to being involved in
the felony that led to the murder, under the felony-murder rule he was considered guilty of
the murder as well.
41
Brady, 373 U.S. at 88.
36
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of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 42 The Court expanded this due process
protection which had been rooted in a violation involving a prosecutor’s
knowing presentation of false testimony, stating: “We now hold that the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or
to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.” 43 The materiality analysis was initially conceived in the cases
involving the knowing use of perjured testimony at trial, but in Brady the
Court brought the concept to fruition in the context of a prosecutor
withholding evidence at the discovery phase. The Court rooted this holding
in the same principle that underlies the preceding decisions, namely that
“[t]he United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in
the courts.” 44 A prosecutor has simultaneous and potentially conflicting
roles as an adversary of the defense and an agent of a sovereign. With
Brady and those cases that precede it, the Court placed great emphasis on
the prosecutor’s role as a seeker of the truth, especially when that truth is
exculpatory to a criminal defendant. 45 “Society wins not only when the
guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the
administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.”46
The Court was aware of the broad and far-reaching effects of the
Brady decision in establishing a constitutional violation in the context of
criminal discovery. 47 However, despite the Court’s implicit recognition that
it was creating a watershed constitutional rule relating to criminal trial
practice, nothing in the Brady opinion indicates that the Court foresaw the
controversy that would develop regarding the differences between the
knowing presentation of false testimony and the withholding of evidence
favorable to the accused at the discovery phase. These situations are
analytically similar in that they both involve a prosecutor withholding
evidence that is helpful to the accused, but they are procedurally quite
42

Id. at 86.
Id. at 87.
44
Id.
45
For an interesting assessment of Brady’s disclosure rule in the context of plea
bargaining, see John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and
Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437 (2001).
46
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see also Sara Gurwitch, When Self-Policing Does Not Work: A
Proposal for Policing Prosecutors in Their Obligation to Provide Exculpatory Evidence to
the Defense, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 303, 307 (2010) (“In Brady, the Court made clear that
its paramount interest was the protection of an accused individual’s right to a fair trial.”).
43

47

In any event the Court’s due process advice goes substantially beyond the holding below. I
would employ more confining language and would not cast in constitutional form a broad rule of
criminal discovery. Instead, I would leave this task, at least for now, to the rule-making or
legislative process after full consideration by legislators, bench, and bar.

Brady, 373 U.S. at 92 (White, J., concurring).
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different. In the Brady context, the prosecutor has withheld evidence that
would be helpful to the defendant, while in the perjured testimony context
the prosecutor has either elicited or failed to correct statements in open
court that he knew were false at the time they were uttered. Later opinions
clarified the difficulties embedded in this difference.48 It is more
challenging to identify retrospectively what evidence a prosecutor should
have turned over to the defense than it is to determine when a prosecutor
should have corrected testimony he knew to be false at trial. Put another
way, there is less ambiguity about whether a prosecutor has violated the due
process rights of a criminal defendant where the prosecutor has knowingly
presented false testimony in open court.49
Though the Court in Brady did not set a specific standard for
materiality when a prosecutor has suppressed evidence favorable to the
accused, it did establish that due process is violated where “evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment,”50 leaving the question of a
materiality standard to be established in future decisions.
C. SETTING DIFFERING STANDARDS OF MATERIALITY FOR PERJURED
TESTIMONY AND WITHHELD EVIDENCE CLAIMS

Nine years after the Brady decision, the Court established the
materiality standard for determining a constitutional violation in the context
of a prosecutor’s knowing presentation of false testimony in Giglio v.
United States. 51 In Giglio, a witness had been promised that he would not
be prosecuted if he cooperated with the Government. 52 This promise was
made by an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) who did not have the
authority to make such a promise and who was not responsible for trying
the case. 53 The AUSA who actually tried the case had no knowledge that
such a promise had been made to the testifying witness.54 The Court held
that the promise was attributable to the Government, and thus the
48
See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667
(1985) (see infra notes 84–90 and accompanying text).
49
Compare Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957) (see supra notes 16–23 and
accompanying text) (finding an unconstitutional breach of due process for the knowing use
of perjured testimony where a prosecutor artfully asked questions to avoid revealing a
witness’s sexual relationship with defendant’s wife), with Agurs, 427 U.S. at 97 (see infra
notes 62–83 and accompanying text) (finding no violation of due process where the
prosecutor withheld pertinent parts of the victim’s criminal record that would have supported
the defense of self-defense).
50
373 U.S. at 87.
51
405 U.S. 150 (1972).
52
Id. at 151.
53
Id. at 152.
54
Id.
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prosecuting AUSA had “constructive knowledge” of the promise that had
been made to the witness. 55 At trial, this prosecutor elicited testimony that
the witness had not received any consideration in exchange for his
testimony at trial. 56 Despite the fact that the prosecutor was not aware at
the time that this testimony was in fact false, the Court held that the
Government was responsible for knowledge of the unauthorized promise. 57
Constructively, the prosecutor had knowingly used false testimony. 58
In Giglio, the Court articulated the standard of materiality for a
prosecutor’s knowing use of false testimony. The Court focused on the
fundamental fairness of the trial of the accused by reiterating Brady’s rule
that “suppression of material evidence justifies a new trial ‘irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.’” 59 With this foundation, the
Court established the standard for materiality in this context: “A new trial is
required if the false testimony could . . . in any reasonable likelihood have
affected the judgment of the jury.” 60 After articulating this materiality
standard, the Court held that the knowing presentation of false testimony in
Giglio met the standard. 61 The petitioner’s due process rights had been
violated, and a new trial was required.
In United States v. Agurs, the Court addressed some of the pragmatic
concerns with the differing situations in which a prosecutor withholds
information favorable to the accused.62 The defendant in Agurs admitted to
stabbing and killing the victim but argued that she had acted in self-defense.
After conviction, the petitioner learned that the victim had a prior criminal

55

Id. at 154.
Id. at 151–52.
57
Id. at 154. The result of Giglio’s holding relating to inducements is that prosecutors
now make “implied inducements” by indicating that there will likely be some reward for
testifying, yet stopping short of making an explicit promise. This allows witnesses to testify
honestly that they have not received any actual promises in exchange for testimony. Legal
scholars argue that courts should limit this practice. See R. Michael Cassidy, “Soft Words of
Hope:” Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, and the Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 NW. U.
L. REV. 1129, 1130 (2004).
56

58
[W]hether the nondisclosure was a result of negligence or design, it is the responsibility of the
prosecutor. The prosecutor’s office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the
Government. A promise made by one attorney must be attributed, for these purposes, to the
Government . . . . To the extent this places a burden on the large prosecution offices, procedures
and regulations can be established to carry that burden and to insure communication of all
relevant information on each case to every lawyer who deals with it.

Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154.
59
Id. at 153 (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1962)).
60
Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (internal quotation marks omitted).
61
Id. at 155.
62
427 U.S. 97 (1976).
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record that would tend to support the petitioner’s self-defense theory. 63 The
petitioner argued that the prosecutor’s failure to disclose this information to
the defense violated her due process rights. 64
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that there was no violation of due
process because the trial judge remained convinced of the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt after considering the victim’s criminal record in
the context of the trial.65 In reaching this holding, however, it provided an
instructive analytical breakdown of due process violations possible under
Brady. The Court observed that the rule established in Brady applies to
three distinct situations, stating that “[e]ach involves the discovery, after
trial of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown
to the defense.” 66
In the first situation, “the undisclosed evidence demonstrates that the
prosecution’s case includes perjured testimony and that the prosecution
knew, or should have known, of the perjury.” 67 In this scenario, the Court
reiterated the materiality standard established in Giglio: that “a conviction
obtained by knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair, and
must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false
testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.” 68 The Court
recognized that this was a strict standard of materiality, i.e., one that cuts in
favor of the accused, and that this was appropriate because it followed the
Mooney line of cases and reflected the value placed on the sanctity of “the
truth-seeking function of the trial process.” 69
In the second situation, a defendant makes a pretrial request for
specific evidence. This is the situation “illustrated by the Brady case
itself.” 70 The Supreme Court highlighted the Brady decision’s focus on the
fact that the evidence had been requested by the defendant and that it was

63

“[The victim’s] prior record included a plea of guilty to a charge of assault and
carrying a deadly weapon in 1963 and another guilty plea to a charge of carrying a deadly
weapon in 1997. Apparently both weapons were knives.” Id. at 100–01.
64
There was substantial confusion in the lower courts’ opinions, demonstrating the need
for some clarity and direction from the Supreme Court regarding due process violations in
this context. The district court rejected the Government’s argument that “there was no duty
to disclose material evidence unless requested to do so,” but held that the evidence was not
material. Id. at 101–02. The court of appeals found no misconduct by the prosecutor but
held that “the evidence was material and that its nondisclosure required a new trial because
the jury might have returned a different verdict if the evidence had been received.” Id.
65
Id. at 114.
66
Id. at 103.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 104.
70
Id.

678

CHARLIE DEVORE

[Vol. 101

material. 71 The Court noted that materiality was established in Brady
because the withheld evidence very likely had an impact on the jury’s
punishment determination.
The Court then turned to the third situation in which a Brady violation
might occur, which applied to the factual scenario of Agurs. In this
situation, the defense made no request for exculpatory evidence at all, nor
did it ask for “all Brady material” or “anything exculpatory.” 72 The Court
stated that under these circumstances, the mere possibility that a piece of
withheld evidence might have helped the defense or impacted the outcome
of the trial “does not establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense.”73
However, the defendant “should not have to satisfy the severe burden of
demonstrating that newly discovered evidence probably would have
resulted in acquittal.” 74 Though this would be the standard if the evidence
was discovered from a neutral source, the fact that the given piece of
evidence was “available to the prosecutor and not submitted to the defense
places it in a different category.” 75 Therefore, the Court established the
materiality standard for this situation as whether the undisclosed evidence
“creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.”76 The Court in
Agurs held that the evidence of the victim’s criminal record did not do so.
A comparison of the materiality standards for each of the three
categories of Brady violations listed here illustrates the Supreme Court’s
interest in placing the highest protection against a prosecutor’s knowing use
of perjured testimony. First, where a prosecutor knowingly presents false
testimony, the test of materiality is whether there is “any reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the
jury.” 77 Second, where a defendant has made a specific request for
evidence and the prosecutor has suppressed this evidence, the test of
materiality is whether the evidence has an impact on the determination of
guilt or of punishment. 78 Third, where a defendant has not made a request
at all, or has made only a general request for exculpatory evidence, the test
71

Id.
Id. at 106 (“Such a request really gives the prosecutor no better notice than if no
request is made.”).
73
Id. at 109–10.
74
Id. at 111.
75
Id. at 110–11 (“[T]he attorney for the sovereign must prosecute the accused with
earnestness and vigor, he must always be faithful to his client’s overriding interest that
‘justice shall be done.’ He is the ‘servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt
shall not escape or innocence suffer.’”) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935)).
76
427 U.S. at 111.
77
Id. at 103.
78
Id. at 106.
72
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of materiality is whether the “omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt
that did not otherwise exist.” 79 These three tests of materiality sit on a
continuum. The first is a “strict standard of materiality” that is not
permissive of the prosecution’s misconduct. 80 A strict standard is
appropriate in this circumstance because such a violation “involve[s] a
corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process.” 81 The second
and third tests are more permissive of the prosecution’s withholding or
suppression of evidence. 82 There is necessarily more ambiguity involved in
the degree unfairness inherent in a prosecutor’s withholding of a piece of
evidence at the discovery phase.
Evidence that is clearly and
unquestionably exculpatory will give rise to an obligation to divulge the
evidence to the defense, but the impact of other evidence on the case may
be difficult to predict at discovery. As investigation proceeds and facts
develop, the importance of a piece of evidence may increase or decrease.
This ambiguity is compounded by a difficulty identified by Justice Marshall
in his dissent to Agurs: if the evidence had been known to the defendant
before the beginning of the trial, the defendant’s trial strategy may have
been altogether different. 83
All of the ambiguity involved in the factual scenario of a prosecutor’s
withholding of evidence favorable to the accused during discovery
necessitates a standard that is more flexible, or more permissive to the
prosecutor’s decision to withhold. Thus the Court requires reversal in these
cases only when the withheld evidence would change the result of the trial
or give rise to a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. However,
this ambiguity simply does not exist where a prosecutor knowingly uses
perjured testimony during trial. Either a prosecutor knows that a falsehood
has been uttered in open court or he does not. This allows for a materiality
standard that is less flexible and permissive of a prosecutor’s discretion and
more protective of the defendant on trial.

79

Id. at 112.
Id. at 104.
81
Id. The Court also noted that “a conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured
testimony is fundamentally unfair,” and quoted language from Mooney, which indicated that
obtaining a conviction through the use of perjured testimony is “as inconsistent with the
rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of like result by intimidation.” Id.
82
It is not necessary to compare the relative “strictness” of the second and third
scenarios. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Bagley (discussed supra at note 48),
combined these scenarios and applied a single materiality standard to both. 473 U.S. 667
(1985).
83
427 U.S. at 117 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
80
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In United States v. Bagley, the Court further clarified the materiality
standard according to the categories outlined in Agurs. 84 The Court in
Bagley developed the materiality standards used in assessing Brady
violations by collapsing two of the Agurs categories into one.85 Notably,
the Giglio materiality standard for a prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured
testimony remained intact. 86 The Court created a new materiality test
“sufficiently flexible to cover the ‘no request,’ ‘general request,’ and
‘specific request’” scenarios relating to withholding of evidence claims. 87
The Court articulated the following standard for a prosecutor’s withholding
of evidence favorable to the defendant: “The evidence is material only if
there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome.” 88 The Court echoed Justice Marshall’s concerns from his
dissent in Agurs about a defendant making trial strategy decisions
predicated on the assumption that evidence does not exist when the
prosecution fails to respond to a request. However, the Court asserted that
this materiality standard allows for consideration of alterations in the
defendant’s strategy:
The reviewing court should assess the possibility that such effect might have occurred
in light of the totality of the circumstances and with an awareness of the difficulty of
reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would
have taken had the defense not been misled by the prosecutor’s incomplete
89
response.

The Court remanded the case to the court of appeals to apply the newly
clarified standard and determine whether there was a reasonable probability
84
473 U.S. 667 (1985). The petitioner, Bagley, had been convicted of narcotics
violations based on testimony from two informants who were working with the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. Although counsel for the defense had made specific
requests for “deals, promises or inducements” offered to the informants, the Government did
not disclose the fact that the informants had in fact received payment for their assistance
with the case and that their payment would be paid “commensurate with services and
information rendered.” The petitioner eventually learned of these contracts for payment
after the trial as a result of a request pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. Id. at 671.
85
See Paul G. Nofer, Note, Specific Requests and the Prosecutorial Duty to Disclose
Evidence: The Impact of United States v. Bagley, 1986 DUKE L.J. 892 (1986) (asserting that
the Bagley decision’s combination of these two Agurs categories is appropriate because the
harm to the defendant is the same in a nondisclosure following either a specific request or a
general request).
86
473 U.S. at 682.
87
Id. at 682.
88
Id. (applying definition of “reasonable probability” from Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
89
473 U.S. at 683.
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that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the withheld
evidence been disclosed to the defense.90
D. THE DICTA THAT LED TO THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

In Kyles v. Whitley, the Supreme Court compared the standard
established under Bagley to harmless error analysis, and in so doing set out
dicta that has led directly to the circuit split addressed in this Comment. 91
In this case, the State willfully withheld evidence tending to exculpate the
accused and impeach witnesses, but the Court did not address this knowing
presentation of false testimony. 92 After jettisoning any assessment of the
first Agurs category of cases, the Court turned to the Bagley decision to
elaborate on the rule and analysis that Bagley compels.
The Court applied the standard of materiality for withholding of
evidence cases identified above: “[R]egardless of request, favorable
evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by
the government, ‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.’” 93 Critically, once a reviewing court has found constitutional
error under Bagley, there is no need for further harmless error review. 94
The Bagley standard for materiality “necessarily entails the conclusion that
the suppression must have had ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence
in determining the jury’s verdict.’”95 Applying this framework, the Kyles
Court held that, viewed together, the collective impact of the suppressed
evidence required a new trial.96
The dicta set out by the Supreme Court in Kyles that has precipitated
the circuit split regards the Court’s assertion that a finding of materiality
under Bagley forecloses any further harmless error review. The specific
language used by the Court is as follows: “Assuming, arguendo, that a
harmless-error enquiry were to apply, a Bagley error could not be treated as
harmless.” 97 The Court explained that where the Bagley standard applies,
any harmless error analysis would be meaningless because an offense has to
90

Id. at 684.
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995).
92
There was a question as to a prosecutor’s knowing presentation of false testimony in
this case regarding eyewitness testimony, but this issue was not before the Court. Id. at 433
n.7.
93
Id. at 433.
94
Id. at 436.
95
Id. (quoting the harmless error review standard from Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.
619, 623 (1993)).
96
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 454.
97
Id. at 435.
91
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rise beyond the harmless error standard to meet the Bagley materiality
standard. 98 The standard for harmless error, established in Brecht v.
Abrahamson, is whether the error “had substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury’s verdict,” 99 while the standard for
materiality under Bagley is “whether, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 100
The Court’s illustration of the comparative strictness of these two
standards has been interpreted by two circuit courts as an endorsement of
the applicability of a Brecht harmless error analysis where a prosecutor has
withheld evidence or presented perjured testimony. The First and Sixth
Circuits have each reasoned that, since the Supreme Court stated that a
withholding of evidence error could not be treated as harmless, it is
appropriate to analyze whether a prosecutor’s knowing presentation of
perjured testimony could be treated as harmless.101 These courts reasoned
that it is possible to meet the materiality standard (whether the false
testimony “could have affected the judgment of the jury”) but fail to rise
beyond the harmless error standard (whether the false testimony “had
substantial and injurious effect in determining the jury’s verdict”). Thus,
relying on Kyles, these circuit courts have established a two-step analysis
for a prosecutor’s knowing use of false testimony. First, the court analyzes
whether the standard of materiality has been met, and second, the court
analyzes whether the constitutional violation is nonetheless harmless
error. 102
Whether or not this two-step test is appropriate, Kyles does not provide
a principled justification for making such an analysis. In Kyles, the
Supreme Court conspicuously refused to analyze the prosecutor’s knowing
use of false testimony, and only made a comparison between the Bagley
materiality standard and harmless error analysis. It did not assert that
harmless error analysis would be appropriate in this sort of case and
preceded its analysis with the clause “[a]ssuming, arguendo, that a
harmless-error enquiry were to apply.” 103

98

Id. at 435–36.
507 U.S. at 776 (1993).
100
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
101
See discussion of Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577, 588 (6th Cir. 2009) and Gilday
v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 267 (1st Cir. 1995), supra note 9 and accompanying text.
102
See, e.g., Gilday, 59 F.3d at 268.
103
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435.
99
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III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
In the Ninth Circuit case Hayes v. Brown, 104 the prosecutor knowingly
presented false testimony, and the defendant was convicted of first-degree
murder. 105 In determining whether reversal was required, the Hayes court
applied the materiality standard first articulated in Giglio, looking to see
whether there was “any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could
have affected the judgment of the jury.” 106 The prosecutor in Hayes
knowingly elicited testimony that made a false representation as to the key
witness’s motive to testify. The court found that the knowing presentation
of perjured testimony cleared the bar of the materiality standard and
required the case to be retried. 107
In assessing this case in the context of the circuit split regarding a
prosecutor’s knowing presentation of false testimony, it is helpful to note
that the Ninth Circuit relied on jurisprudence that strongly supports reversal
under these circumstances. The Hayes court quoted language stating that
where a perjured testimony violation is found, “the conviction must be set
aside.” 108 The court also quoted persuasive authority from the Second
Circuit stating, “[i]ndeed, if it is established that the government knowingly
permitted the introduction of false testimony reversal is ‘virtually
automatic.’” 109 Reliance on this authority indicates that the court was
particularly amenable to the idea of reversal and a finding of materiality.
The court’s attitude is meaningful since the materiality standard is abstract
by nature and invites an exercise of judicial discretion.

104

399 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). For commentary on the Ninth Circuit’s
unique en banc practices, see Pamela Ann Rymer, The “Limited” En Banc: Half Full, or
Half Empty?, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 317 (2006) (asserting that in the Ninth Circuit, a full en banc
is not practicable given that there are twenty-eight active circuit judges, yet the limited en
banc is based on the false premise that some limited number of judges can speak for the
entire court).
105
The prosecutor in Hayes took steps to simultaneously induce the key witness to testify
and to bolster this witness’s credibility. The prosecutor reached an agreement with the
witness’s attorney to dismiss felony charges in exchange for the testimony, but bound the
attorney not to tell the witness about the agreement. This way the witness could testify
honestly that he had not received any inducements and thus would appear more credible to
the jury. The prosecutor then made statements to the court that “There has [sic] been
absolutely no negotiations whatsoever in regard to [the witness’s] testimony.” Further, the
prosecutor elicited testimony at trial that the witness had not been promised anything in
exchange for his testimony. 399 F.3d at 979–80.
106
Id. at 984.
107
Id. at 985.
108
Id. at 984 (quoting Belmontes v. Woodford, 350 F.3d 861, 866 (9th Cir. 2003)).
109
Hayes, 399 F.3d at 978 (quoting United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.
1991)).
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The Hayes court then addressed directly whether a finding of
materiality is sufficient to warrant reversal, or whether it is necessary to
further determine whether the error was harmless under Brecht. The Ninth
Circuit looked to Kyles for guidance and found that “for all errors that
derived from the Agurs materiality standard, there was no need to conduct a
separate Brecht analysis.” 110 Where the Supreme Court has established a
materiality standard, there is no further need for Brecht analysis. 111
Diverging from the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, the First Circuit and,
more recently, the Sixth Circuit have relied on Kyles as authority for
establishing a two-step test for determining whether a prosecutor’s knowing
use of false testimony requires reversal. Both the First and Sixth Circuit
tests first determine whether the violation satisfies the Giglio materiality
standard, and second determine whether the violation is harmless error
under Brecht. In the First Circuit decision, Gilday v. Callahan, the
defendant’s two co-conspirators testified erroneously at trial that they had
not been offered deals in exchange for their testimony, and the prosecution
failed to correct these perjured statements.112 Further, the Government
failed to disclose exculpatory evidence from three eyewitnesses. 113
The framework used by the Gilday court in assessing these potential
Brady violations is substantially different from the framework used by the
Ninth Circuit in Hayes. The Hayes court viewed the application of a onestep test in Kyles, solely concerned with a finding of materiality, as
requiring reversal no matter whether a prosecutor had withheld favorable
evidence or presented perjured testimony. The Gilday court, however, saw
an analytical difference between withholding evidence and presenting
perjured testimony, allowing for different tests to determine whether
reversal is necessary. The Gilday court noted that where a prosecutor has
knowingly presented perjured testimony, “a petitioner is given the benefit
of a friendly standard (hostile to the prosecution) to establish
materiality.” 114 The materiality standard for the knowing use of perjured
testimony (whether the false testimony could reasonably be said to have
impacted the judgment of the jury) is more “friendly” to the petitioner than
is the Brecht harmless error standard (whether the perjured testimony in fact
had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict).
110

Hayes, 399 F.3d at 985 (relying on reasoning set out in Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.
419, 436 (1995)). For a more detailed discussion of Brecht’s interaction with the materiality
standard for a prosecutor’s knowing presentation of false testimony, see infra notes 152–56
and accompanying text.
111
399 F.3d at 985.
112
Gilday v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 260 (1st Cir. 1995).
113
Id. at 267.
114
Id. at 268.
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Thus, in this situation, “it is quite possible to find a constitutional violation,
but to conclude that it was harmless.” 115
In order to justify the application of a harmless error standard in this
context, the Gilday court relied on the Kyles reasoning that “the
[withholding of favorable evidence] materiality standard necessarily
requires a court to find an impact on the jury verdict sufficiently substantial
to satisfy the Brecht harmless error test.” Yet, the Gilday court reasoned
that the perjured testimony materiality standard, being more “friendly” to
the petitioner, does not necessarily entail satisfaction of the Brecht harmless
error test. Thus the Gilday court explained this new two-part test in the
following way: “When faced with such a claim, therefore, our inquiry is
necessarily two-pronged: was there failure to disclose material exculpatory
evidence, and, if yes, was such a failure harmless?”116 The Gilday court, in
applying this new two-pronged analysis, found that the knowing
presentation of false testimony claims passed the materiality test but failed
the harmless error analysis. Thus, the court found “no remediable Brady
violation.” 117 The method in which the court disposed of the Brady
violations established a completely new two-part analysis, purportedly
rooted in the then-recent Supreme Court cases of Brecht and Kyles. 118
The most recent case in the circuit split on this issue, Rosencrantz v.
Lafler, 119 followed Gilday’s lead in applying a two-step test for a
prosecutor’s knowing presentation of false testimony. The sexual assault
victim in Rosencrantz had erroneously denied going to the prosecutor’s
office in advance of the trial and denied sitting in the prosecutor’s office on
the day of the trial.120 “The prosecutor remained silent during this colloquy
and never reopened the topic during the trial.”121
In analyzing this instance of knowing use of false testimony, the
Rosencrantz court began by reiterating the materiality standard outlined in
Giglio, that a “conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured
testimony must be set aside if the false testimony could . . . in any
115

Id.
Id.
117
Id. at 272.
118
Gilday was decided in July 1995. Id. at 257. Kyles was decided in April 1995. 514
U.S. 419, 419 (1995). Brecht was decided in 1993. 507 U.S. 619, 619 (1993)
119
Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2009).
120
Id. at 580.
121
Id. at 581. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which the victim
testified and admitted that she had met “with the prosecutor . . . and several police officers
approximately three times prior to trial . . . .” Id. at 582. The district court found this to be
credible and the state did not offer any evidence or testimony as rebuttal. Thus, the court
“concluded that the prosecution allowed false testimony to stand uncorrected when [the
victim] denied any pretrial meetings.” Id. at 583.
116
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reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury.”122 The court
then drew a distinction between cases in which a prosecutor knowingly
used perjured testimony (which the court called “Brady/Giglio” cases) and
cases in which a prosecutor has withheld evidence favorable to the accused
(which the court referred to as simply “Brady claims”). The court stated
that “in these Brady/Giglio claims, the materiality assessment is less
stringent than that for more general Brady withholding of evidence
claims.” 123 The court then drew a questionable conclusion, relying in part
on the persuasive authority of the Gilday decision: “[W]hile a traditional
Brady materiality analysis obviates a later harmless-error review under
Brecht v. Abrahamson, courts may excuse Brady/Giglio violations
involving known and materially false statements as harmless error.” 124
In addition to the Gilday framework, the court included a reference to
Carter v. Mitchell 125 to support its decision. 126 The court’s reference to
Carter is suspect, given the court’s statement on the previous page of the
opinion that “Carter summarily cited harmless error as an alternative basis
for denying a false-testimony claim, and this circuit has yet to explicitly
hold that a knowing-presentation-of-false-testimony due process violation
should be reviewed for harmless error.” 127 Thus the Carter decision did not
provide authority for the two-step analysis applied by the Rosencrantz
court.
The Rosencrantz court also referenced Kyles to justify this rule. In a
footnote, it quoted the Kyles analysis that meeting the traditional Brady
materiality standard necessarily compels the conclusion that the error has
met the harmless error standard. 128 The court made a significant leap in
logic that is not warranted by the Kyles decision by implying that Kyles
approved of a harmless error review for traditional Brady claims, and only

122

Id. (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)).
568 F.3d at 584.
124
Id.
125
443 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2006). In Carter, the Sixth Circuit denied a habeas corpus
petition on the grounds that the petitioner’s trial counsel was not ineffective and there were
independent and adequate state grounds to uphold the conviction. The court found that the
prosecutor’s failure to correct misleading statements by a key prosecution witness did not
meet the Giglio materiality standard. Id. at 535–36.
126
Rosencrantz, 568 F.3d at 584.
127
Id. at 583. The Rosencrantz court’s pincite reference includes an explanation in
Carter that the knowing use of false testimony in that case did not meet the materiality
standard articulated in Giglio and then goes on to say: “Moreover, for these same reasons,
any constitutional error would have been harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson.” Carter,
443 F.3d at 537 (citation omitted).
128
Rosencrantz, 568 F.3d at 584 n.1.
123
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disregarded harmless error review in these circumstances because the Brady
materiality standard surpasses the harmless error standard. 129
Having established this framework, the Rosencrantz court went on to
find that the prosecutor’s knowing presentation of false evidence was
material, and yet excusable as harmless error.130 Interestingly, the court did
not seem overly concerned with whether the knowing presentation of
perjured testimony was material. In its introductory statements, the court
stated, “[W]e affirm the district court’s denial of Rosencrantz’s petition
because, even assuming the materiality of the testimony at issue, the
prosecutorial misconduct qualifies as harmless under Brecht v.
Abrahamson.” 131 In addressing the materiality of this violation, the court
observed that the perjury itself (the victim’s assertion that she did not have
pretrial meetings with the prosecutor regarding her testimony when in fact
she did) was relatively minor in this case. 132 However, the jury could have
been impacted if the victim had been confronted with her perjury in court.
“[I]t is reasonable to infer that exposing [the victim] as untruthful—thereby
tipping the jury to another of [her] inconsistencies and her willingness to lie
under oath—would have affected the jury’s view of [her] credibility.” 133
Rather than making a finding of materiality, the court stated, “Here, we will
assume that [the victim’s] lie about the pretrial meeting is material.”134 The
fact that the victim’s perjury did not have an overwhelming impact on the
result of the trial allowed the court to be flexible in its application of the
materiality standard and establish a new Sixth Circuit rule of applying
harmless error analysis to these types of cases.
Essentially, the Rosencrantz court applied a two-step test identical to
the test set out in Gilday. However, the Sixth Circuit advanced the
argument in favor of the two-step test by appealing to the policy concerns
that underpin the Brecht decision. The court asserted that a stringent
harmless error standard is appropriate as a second step because it “honors
129

See discussion of Kyles v. Whitley, supra notes 91–103 and accompanying text,
pointing out that the Kyles comparison of the Brady standard and the harmless error standard
was preceded by the clause, “Assuming, arguendo, that a harmless-error enquiry were to
apply, a Bagley error could not be treated as harmless . . . .” 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995).
Thus, Kyles did not command that harmless error analysis applied under these
circumstances.
130
568 F.3d at 591.
131
Id. at 580.
132
Id. at 588 (“Given the implausibility of the untruthful answer Lasky gave—jurors
would expect the prosecuting witness to meet with the prosecution before trial—we might
assess the impact as minimal.”).
133
Id.
134
Id. (emphasis added). Further, the court begins its “Harmless Error” section with the
words “Having assumed materiality and therefore assumed a constitutional error . . . .” Id.
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Brecht’s weighty concerns,” including the state’s interest in finality,
expenditure of time and resources of retrial, erosion of memory and
dispersion of witnesses, and society’s interest in the prompt administration
of justice. 135 This rationale supports applying a stringent standard
generally, but the Rosencrantz majority opinion did not endeavor to balance
the policy concerns it identified against the due process protections set in
place by the Giglio standard for materiality where a prosecutor has
knowingly used false testimony.
The dissent in Rosencrantz argued that a finding of materiality
necessarily forecloses any harmless error analysis, regardless of the relative
comparison of the materiality and harmless error standards.136 Cases
involving certain prosecutorial misconduct “can so undermine confidence in
a verdict and impact the fairness of a trial that a new trial is required.” 137
Thus the majority’s application of a harmless error standard was
inappropriate.
The Supreme Court has articulated and developed
materiality standards for the Brady line of cases. Therefore, it is
inappropriate to treat “Brady and its associated line of cases as providing
merely a threshold test for Brecht’s harmless-error analysis.” 138 The dissent
argued that it is inappropriate to combine Brady and Brecht into a single
analytical framework:
Given the conceptual framework of Brady and Brecht, we should not shoehorn Brady
into Brecht’s harmless-error analysis. Rather, Brady and Brecht remain consistent
only so long as they stand apart. The Court’s only task in the present case, then, is to
139
apply the Giglio test. If the test is satisfied, a new trial is required.

Since the Supreme Court has set out a specific materiality standard for
a prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony, according to the dissent,
it is inappropriate to apply an additional test that erodes the standard
established by the Supreme Court.
IV. ROSENCRANTZ AND GILDAY ARE DEAD (OR THEY SHOULD BE)
A. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE IS UNAMBIGUOUS IN ITS
REQUIREMENT OF A ONE-STEP MATERIALITY TEST FOR PERJURED
TESTIMONY

The Supreme Court has never established or affirmed a two-part test
for determining when reversal is appropriate in the case of a prosecutor’s

135
136
137
138
139

Id. at 589–90.
Id. at 592 (Cole, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 594 (internal quotations omitted).
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knowing use of perjured testimony. A comprehensive look at the Supreme
Court jurisprudence in this factual scenario shows the careful development
of a materiality standard that best reflects the Court’s desire to uphold the
truthseeking process of a criminal trial. In the 1935 case of Mooney v.
Holohan, the Supreme Court first asserted that a prosecutor’s deliberate
presentation of perjured testimony is “as inconsistent with the rudimentary
demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation.”140
For the next thirty-seven years, the Supreme Court endeavored to clarify the
triggering circumstances that compel a new trial when the prosecutor has
knowingly presented perjured testimony. In Alcorta, the Court’s analysis
indicated that there would be no per se rule of reversal, but rather a
reviewing court must consider the impact of the falsehood on the jury. 141
The Alcorta majority also found that a prosecutor’s failure to correct false
testimony will be treated the same as a prosecutor’s presentation of false
testimony. 142 In Napue, the Court stated that this protection applies against
false testimony that is presented whether it is material to the defendant’s
guilt or to the witness’s credibility. 143 And in Brady, the Court applied this
protection whether it would impact the fact-finder’s finding of guilt, or only
the determination of punishment. 144 After thirty-seven years of developing
the doctrine in this area, the Supreme Court articulated the materiality
standard for a prosecutor’s knowing use of false testimony in the 1971 case
Giglio v. United States. “A new trial is required if the false testimony
could . . . in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the
jury.” 145
The materiality standard, carefully developed by the Court and set out
in Giglio, has remained in force for the last thirty-nine years and is still
good law today. In fact, both the Gilday and Rosencrantz courts recognized
its authority and applied it in their analysis.146 There is good authority for
deploying the Giglio materiality standard for a prosecutor’s knowing use of
false testimony and using it as the standard for determining when the due
process rights of a criminal defendant have been violated in a way that
demands a new trial. However, there is no Supreme Court jurisprudence
authorizing the second step of the test employed by Gilday and
Rosencrantz. The harmless error analysis as applied in those decisions
140

294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935).
Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31–32 (1957).
142
Id. at 30–31.
143
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).
144
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1962).
145
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (internal quotations omitted).
146
See Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 2009); Gilday v. Callahan, 59
F.3d 257, 267 (1st Cir. 1995).
141
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completely swallows the materiality standard that has been carefully
considered by the Supreme Court and has withstood the test of time.
Both the Gilday and Rosencrantz decisions relied on the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Kyles as authority for applying the second step of their
test, the harmless error analysis. Two aspects of the Kyles decision
undercut the validity of relying on it as authority for modifying the
materiality test for a prosecutor’s knowing use of false testimony. First,
Kyles was not a case about a prosecutor’s knowing use of false testimony.
In Kyles, the prosecution withheld evidence that was favorable to the
defendant, and the opinion clarified confusion in the lower court’s opinion
about applying the materiality standard for withheld evidence under Brady
and Bagley. 147 Since Kyles was not a case about a prosecutor’s knowing
presentation of false testimony, it cannot be said to set out a rule for this
context. In fact, the Supreme Court explicitly stated in the Kyles opinion
that it was not addressing knowing use of perjured testimony. 148
Secondly, in Kyles the Court compared the standard of materiality to
the harmless error standard, but it did not assert that both of these standards
should be used to analyze either withholding of evidence or knowing use of
perjured testimony. It seems that there are two purposes for the Court’s
comparison of these standards. First, the court of appeals had applied both
Bagley materiality and harmless error review, and the Supreme Court was
illustrating that this was illogical. Since the Bagley materiality standard is
stricter than the harmless error standard, any withholding of evidence that
satisfied Bagley materiality would necessarily satisfy the harmless error
standard. 149 Secondly, the Supreme Court had provided a new formulation
of harmless error just two years before the Kyles decision in Brecht. The
Supreme Court was likely trying to provide some guidance to courts
applying each of these standards in the future. Materiality (and harmless
error) standards are abstract by their nature. Comparison of two abstract
standards provides some guideposts to lower courts in determining which
standards are more or less strict. In Kyles, the Court demonstrated that it
was merely providing instructive analysis through dicta rather than
authorizing application with its statement, “Assuming, arguendo, that a
harmless-error enquiry were to apply . . . .” 150
The Sixth Circuit specifically endorsed the application of harmless
error analysis in Rosencrantz because it honors “Brecht’s weighty
147

See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435–38 (1995).
Id. at 433 n.7. (“[W]e do not consider the question whether Kyles’s conviction was
obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony and our decision today does not address
any claim under the first Agurs category.”).
149
Id. at 435.
150
Id.
148
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concerns.” 151 In Brecht, the harmless error standard articulated by the
Court is whether the error “had a substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 152 The First and Sixth Circuit
rely on the authority of Brecht. However, the factual scenario in Brecht is
fundamentally different from cases in which a prosecutor has knowingly
presented false testimony at trial. Brecht was a case in which the prosecutor
used a defendant’s post-Miranda silence to impeach the defendant’s claim
that a shooting was accidental. 153 This is significantly different from any
sort of Brady violation in that the Supreme Court has not separately
established a materiality standard for a Miranda violation, and therefore it
was appropriate in Brecht for the Court to establish a general catch-all
harmless error standard. 154
As Justice O’Connor observed in her dissent to Brecht, “Miranda is a
prophylactic rule that actually impedes the truthseeking function of criminal
trials.” 155 Setting aside for a moment the justifications for the Miranda
protection, it is clear that without this rule more information would be
known to authorities more quickly regarding a crime. Thus, Miranda sets
up an impediment to truthseeking in the name of protection of the rights of
arrestees. The Brady line of cases does just the opposite. That is, Brady
affords for an enhancement to the truthseeking function of a criminal trial.
When a prosecutor is aware of exculpatory evidence in a case, he is
obligated to turn this evidence over to the accused. Where a prosecutor
hears testimony that he knows to be perjured in open court, he is obligated
to correct it. For these reasons, the application of Brecht’s standard is
wholly inappropriate. Since the Supreme Court has articulated a specific
materiality standard for a prosecutor’s knowing presentation of false
testimony, it is appropriate to apply only that materiality standard and not to
erode it with an additional layer of harmless error review. Indeed, if not for
the dicta from the Kyles case, circuit courts would not likely consider
applying Brecht’s standard for harmless error in the first place.

151

Rosencrantz, 568 F.3d at 589.
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 624 (1993) (internal quotations omitted).
153
Id. at 624–26.
154
Or, more accurately, it was appropriate for the Court to develop the then-existing
harmless error standard to reflect policy concerns. For a summary of the development of the
harmless error standard, see Ana M. Otero, In Harm’s Way—A Dismal State of Justice: The
Legal Odyssey of Cesar Fierro, 16 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 119, 135–49 (2005).
155
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 651 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
152
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B. ANY AMBIGUITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE SHOULD BE RESOLVED
IN FAVOR OF A SINGULAR MATERIALITY STANDARD

The First and Sixth Circuits have read some ambiguity into the
Supreme Court’s comparison of the Bagley materiality standard and the
Brecht harmless error standard in Kyles. They posit that since the standard
for the prosecutor’s knowing presentation of perjured testimony is more
“friendly” 156 to the defendant than the materiality standard for withholding
of evidence favorable to the accused, an additional layer of harmless error
analysis is warranted. This Comment has argued that no such ambiguity
exists in the jurisprudence. However, if any ambiguity can be found in the
Kyles opinion, it should be resolved in favor of protecting the due process
rights of the criminal defendant by refusing to apply a second layer of
harmless error analysis after a finding of materiality.
1. Tests Should Be Compared on the Grounds of Protectiveness of Due
Process and Not in Terms of Strictness
The Gilday court refers to the materiality standard for a prosecutor’s
knowing use of false testimony as “more favorable to the defendant” 157 than
the standard for a prosecutor’s withholding of exculpatory evidence and
further refers to the standard as a “lower materiality hurdle.” 158 The
Rosencrantz court refers to this materiality standard as “less stringent” 159
and as “friendly-to-the-accused.” 160 This portrayal is an incomplete
characterization of the materiality standard for perjured testimony. When
compared to the materiality standard for withheld evidence, it is true that
the standard for perjured testimony presents a lower bar for the accused to
meet. But it is a lower bar because the Supreme Court has carefully
considered the scenarios in which a violation of the materiality standard
might occur and the constitutional protections at play, and determined that
this standard is appropriately protective and practicable. 161
The materiality standard for withheld evidence grew out of the
protections that had been put in place against perjured testimony. 162 But the
Supreme Court carefully analyzed and differentiated the two situations in
Agurs and Bagley and articulated that because of practical considerations, a

156

Gilday v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 268 (1st Cir. 1995).
Id. at 267.
158
Id. at 268.
159
Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577, 584 (6th Cir. 2009).
160
Id. at 587.
161
See discussion of Supreme Court cases developing the materiality standard for a
prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony, supra text at notes 141–46.
162
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1962).
157
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more stringent standard should be applied in the case of withheld evidence.
A prosecutor is not likely to know the worth of each piece of evidence to
the defendant’s case during the discovery phase and should not be asked to
open his file to the defense. 163 Because of this consideration, a higher bar
must be met to demonstrate the unfairness of the prosecutor’s withholding
of a piece of evidence. These practical considerations do not temper the
protections in place against a prosecutor presenting false testimony in open
court. If a witness lies on the stand, and the prosecutor knows it, he must
correct the lie. Any other action would offend the truthseeking nature of the
trial and the pursuit of justice. Or, put another way, it would not advance
the prosecutor’s “twofold aim . . . that guilt shall not escape [n]or innocence
suffer.” 164
The Supreme Court has established that a prosecutor’s knowing use of
false testimony violates the Fourteenth Amendment due process rights of a
criminal defendant. Therefore, couching the materiality standard on a scale
of “strict” to “weak” obscures the reason that the materiality standard is in
place. More appropriately, the materiality standard for a prosecutor’s
knowing use of perjured testimony should be considered on a scale of
protectiveness of due process rights of the criminal defendant. The perjured
testimony materiality standard is more protective of due process rights than
the withheld evidence standard because of the difficulties inherent in
determining the weight of evidence before the commencement of the trial.
The fact that this carefully considered materiality standard is more
protective of due process rights should not permit courts to undercut its
protection by imposing an additional harmless error analysis.
2. A Singular Materiality Test Would Check the Trend of Eroding
Habeas Relief
All of the cases discussed in this Comment reached federal courts on
habeas corpus petitions in which the petitioners alleged that their due
process rights had been violated under the U.S. Constitution. The habeas
process is a safeguard to a criminal defendant and allows federal courts to
review state courts’ analyses of due process violations and to command
retrial if it is found that due process rights have been violated. Legal
163
See Bagley v. United States, 473 U.S. 667, 699 (1985) (asserting that the state should
turn over any evidence that might allow a defendant “whose liberty as at stake” to defend
himself but that an “open file policy” would be too broad to achieve this goal). But see
Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 492–98, 511–14
(2009) (arguing that the Brady rule should be replaced with an open file policy because the
current disclosure requirements may result in even ethical prosecutors under-disclosing
exculpatory evidence).
164
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 (1976) (internal quotations omitted).
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scholars have observed a recent trend of federal courts substantially limiting
habeas review, largely motivated by the passing of Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) in 1996. 165 AEDPA, along with the
1989 case of Teague v. Lane, 166 favors judicial efficiency over the rights of
the habeas petitioner.167 Teague bars federal courts from hearing claims
that rest on recent Supreme Court cases and additionally bars a court from
announcing a new rule in a habeas case and then using it to resolve a
prisoner’s claim. 168 AEDPA further limits habeas review by creating a
statute of limitations for habeas petitions (none existed before AEDPA was
passed), 169 and substantially limiting a federal court from rehearing a claim
in a successive petition for habeas corpus. 170
Congress’s aim in passing AEDPA was to “streamline the habeas
corpus process and to reduce the number of frivolous petitions.” 171 Scholar
JoAnn Lee employed an empirical framework to analyze the impacts of
Teague and AEDPA, using formulas to assess the habeas success rate, filing
rate, and disposal time. 172 She found the real impact of AEDPA was that it
decreased the probability of success in obtaining habeas relief.173
165

See, e.g., Matthew K. Mulder, Finding the “Eternal and Unremitting Force” of
Habeas Corpus: § 2254(d) and the Need for De Novo Review, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1179
(2009) (arguing that the federal courts do not currently sufficiently protect due process rights
of habeas petitioners because of inconsistent application of de novo review under AEDPA
§2254(d)); Anne R. Traum, Last Best Chance for the Great Writ: Equitable Tolling and
Federal Habeas Corpus, 68 MD. L. REV. 545 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court has
limited habeas relief by curtailing equitable tolling available under AEDPA). But see John
H. Blume, AEDPA: the “Hype” and the “Bite”, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 260–64 (2006)
(asserting that, to date, AEDPA has had very little impact on federal courts’ review of
habeas petitions; however, ambiguities in the Act could lead to increased impact).
166
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
167
JoAnn Lee, An Empirical Analysis of Habeas Corpus: The Impact of Teague v. Lane
and the Anti-Terrorism and Death Penalty Act on Habeas Petition Success Rates and
Judicial Efficiency, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 665 (2006).
168
See Teague, 489 U.S. at 300–01 (establishing that a new rule should have a
prospective, and not retrospective, impact). “Given the broad scope of constitutional issues
cognizable on habeas, . . . it is sounder in adjudicating habeas petitions generally to apply the
law prevailing at the time a conviction became final than it is to seek to dispose of the habeas
case on the basis of intervening changes in constitutional interpretation.” Id. at 306 (internal
citations omitted).
169
28 U.S.C. § 2263(a) (2006).
170
Id.
171
Lee, supra note 167, at 669; see also Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity,
Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV. 443, 506 (2007) (asserting that under AEDPA
Congress intended, and federal courts have applied, limitations on habeas review).
172
Lee, supra note 167, at 675.
173
Id. at 684. Lee further found that Teague actually increased the burden of habeas
litigation on federal courts by increasing the amount of time it takes to dispose of habeas
petitions. Id.
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Because of the trend of a decreasing likelihood of success through the
habeas process, it is critical to strengthen the protection of due process
rights. Habeas petitioners are becoming statistically less likely to succeed
Therefore, it is important that the
in obtaining habeas relief.174
jurisprudence establishes a clear, consistent rule that protects the rights of
criminal defendants at trial. It is not appropriate to erode the materiality
standard in cases where prosecutors have violated Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights of criminal defendants, regardless of whether the trend of
limiting habeas review is appropriate.175 The slippery slope toward a pure
interest in judicial efficiency must be stopped where the constitutional
rights of criminal defendants have been violated so flagrantly.
The cases overturned by the work of the Innocence Project also
underscore the importance of protecting criminal defendants against this
type of due process violation. The Innocence Project was founded eighteen
years ago to assist prisoners who could be proven innocent through DNA
testing. 176 According to the Innocence Project website, “[t]here have been
251 post-conviction DNA exonerations in United States history.” 177 The
scientific basis proving the innocence of these prisoners creates a unique
opportunity to analyze and compare the cases of criminal defendants who
were wrongfully convicted. In a survey of the first seventy-four DNA
exonerations, the Innocence Project found that there had been knowing use
of perjured testimony in a full 25% of those cases. 178 It is impossible to
ascertain whether the sample set of defendants who have been exonerated
through the work of the Innocence Project is representative of all prisoners
who have been wrongfully convicted, but the numbers do show that a
prosecutor’s knowing use of false testimony is a significant problem, and
that it can easily lead to a false conviction. Whether a defendant is innocent
or guilty, it is unacceptable to tip the balance toward the prosecution by
eroding the protection against the use of false testimony.
3. The Singular Materiality Standard Would Have a Prophylactic Effect on
Prosecutorial Misconduct
The jurisprudence surrounding Brady violations goes to great lengths
to clarify that the reversal of a case for a Brady violation is not tied to a
174

Id. at 682–83.
See Otero, supra note 154, at 161–69 (arguing that the application of additional
harmless error analysis to constitutional error is ominous given that habeas relief is fasteroding).
176
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 9,
2010).
177
Id.
178
Id.
175
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prosecutor’s culpability but rather is measured in regard to its impact on the
fairness of the trial. 179 However, where a prosecutor willfully exercised bad
faith in withholding evidence, the Brady violation is likely more egregious.
If evidence is particularly exculpatory, or if perjured testimony is critical on
a key issue in a case, a prosecutor’s misconduct with regard to these items
will have a more extreme impact on the case.
A prosecutor who violates due process rights by presenting false
testimony technically opens himself to ethical sanctions under the
applicable state rule against prosecutorial misconduct. Most state ethics
rules regulating prosecutors are based on the American Bar Association
Model Rule 3.8, which includes the mandate that prosecutors “make timely
disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the
However, Professor Niki Kuckes 181 has argued that
offense.” 180
prosecutorial ethics are generally not well-regulated. 182 Professor Kuckes
notes that enforcement and revision of rules governing prosecutorial ethics
is problematic because these rules “tend to antagonize a powerful lobby,
and because political sensitivity inevitably accompanies any efforts to
regulate law enforcement.” 183 Since there are inherent difficulties in
regulating prosecutorial misconduct via ethics sanctions, the strict rule
argued for in this Comment will provide a needed disincentive.
Additionally, disciplinary committees infrequently sanction
prosecutors who violate Brady rules. 184 Professor Sara Gurwitch asserts
that the lack of disciplinary committee action is unsurprising given that the
179
The initial articulation of the materiality standard in Brady included the phrase:
“irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1962).
180
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2009).
181
In 1999, the American Bar Association commissioned Professor Kuckes to complete
a report on the effects and implementation of state ethics rules regulating prosecutorial
ethics. In her report, Professor Kuckes suggested modifications to Rule 3.8 based on areas
of prosecutorial conduct not covered by the rule, yet addressed by various state rules.
Despite a thorough reform of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 2000, Rule
3.8 remained unchanged. Niki Kuckes, The State of Rule 3.8: Prosecutorial Ethics Reform
Since Ethics 2000, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427, 430–31 (2009).
182
Id.; see also Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.,
1573 (2003) (arguing that Rule 3.8 is inadequate to regulate prosecutorial misconduct).
183
Kuckes, supra note 181, at 433.
184
Gurwitch, supra note 46, at 316. Richard Rosen and Joseph Weeks have completed
exhaustive studies of the frequency of disciplinary sanctions in response to Brady violations,
finding that “disciplinary committee action in response to Brady violations is uncommon
and, when it occurs, mild.” Id. at 317 (citing Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a
Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory
Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 883 (1997)); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions
Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693 (1987).
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majority of disciplinary actions involve financial matters.185 Those criminal
defendants wronged by Brady violations will typically “seek to be
vindicated by the courts” rather than by filing disciplinary actions.186 Since
disciplinary sanctions are mild and rare, it is appropriate for the courts to
protect against prosecutorial misconduct by upholding a stringent standard
against a prosecutor’s use of perjured testimony.
In practical terms, the rule argued for in this Comment would not
create a sea change in the treatment of cases where a prosecutor has
knowingly used false testimony. The cases in which a prosecutor
knowingly presents perjured testimony and the testimony is not
overwhelmingly material or immaterial are a small subset of those cases in
which it can be proven that a prosecutor knowingly presented false
testimony. 187 There are relatively few cases in which a knowing use of
perjury might meet the materiality standard yet fail harmless error review.
Therefore, the rate of overturning individual cases would not change
significantly with the enforcement of a singular materiality test for
determining when a case should be overturned. However, the existence of
this clarification would likely make prosecutors more careful, and result in
their erring on the side of caution and ensuring that they do not present
testimony that they know to be false, under threat of reversal.
The prophylactic effect of the clarification of this materiality standard
would be far reaching. The threat of reversal would motivate prosecutors to
pay careful attention to ensuring that they do not present perjury (or let
perjury go uncorrected) at trial. It is inappropriate to follow the majority’s
analysis in Rosencrantz, which effectively sends a message to prosecutors
that some conduct that is recognized as being unconstitutional will be
forgiven in the pursuit of justice. Courts should not stand in as disciplinary
committees, but they should apply a strict standard that prevents the
knowing use of false testimony in pursuit of a criminal conviction.
V. CONCLUSION
The results of Rosencrantz and Gilday are inappropriate. The Supreme
Court should resolve the circuit split and establish that where a prosecutor
knowingly presented false testimony at trial and the false testimony was
material, there should be no further harmless error analysis.
185

Gurwitch, supra note 46, at 317.
Id. at 317.
187
For an alternative explanation of why the rule advocated in this Comment will not
cause a radical change in the rate of reversals, see Gurwitch, supra note 46, at 306 (“The
prosecution’s Brady obligation is largely self-enforced . . . [a]s a result, the lack of
compliance with the Brady rule will often go undetected, and it is fair to assume that most
Brady violations go undiscovered.”).
186
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The Court has developed jurisprudence tailoring the materiality
standard for a prosecutor’s knowing use of perjury to best protect the due
process rights of a criminal defendant. Applying harmless error analysis as
a second step in considering this type of complaint swallows the carefully
considered materiality standard. The Supreme Court jurisprudence in this
area does not support the test established by the Rosencrantz and Gilday
courts. Further, the two-step test violates the Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights of criminal defendants, offends the fundamental fairness and
truthseeking power of the criminal trial, and erodes the incentive for
prosecutors to be vigilant in ensuring they do not present false testimony.
Eliminating the second step harmless error analysis is appropriate
because it values the constitutional rights of the criminal defendant over
judicial efficiency in this circumstance and it sends the appropriate message
to prosecutors that knowing presentation of false testimony will not be
tolerated.

